Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

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Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, methodology): “4 Korean data have also been used extensively in other studies on business groups (Almeida et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2002, 2008, 2012; Baek et al., 2004, 2006; Joh, 2003; Kim and Yi, 2006; Shin and Park, 1999).”
The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, unknown): “Consistent with the expropriation hypothesis, Bae et al. (2012) find that poorly governed Asian firms experience a large decrease in value during the 1997 Asian crisis but perform better during the recovery period.”
How corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea (2015, unknown): “Bae et al. (2012) report that firms with high disparity between the controller’s voting and cash flow rights suffer larger share price drops during the East Asian financial crisis (plausibly due to higher tunneling), and recover faster when the crisis abates.”
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms (2016, result): “In line with previous studies (Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Bae et al., 2012; Lien & Li, 2013; Yu, 2013; Farooqi et al., 2014), this study does not include data on financial firms (banks, securities companies, and insurance companies) because these firms are completely different from non-financial firms…”