Two systems of reasoning.

By Steven A. Sloman. 2002

428 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2547ae39c16bd6da1d83e7a18ccce58b70f21d67

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Citations in the corpus

How distinct are intuition and deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes (2009, background): “Other models postulate a concurrent activation of two distinct systems and a kind of competition among them (Sloman, 2002).”
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. (2003, result): “Variations on this theme of anchoring on intuition are common in the literature (Epley & Gilovich, 2002; Epstein, 1994; Gilbert, 2002; Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Haidt, 2001; Hammond, 2000; Sloman, 2002; Wilson, 2000; Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002).”
A Dual Process Account of Creative Thinking (2011, background): “Similarly, Sloman (2002) proposed that type 1 thinking is based on personal knowledge and computations Correspondence should be sent to Andrew P. Allen, Centre for Occupational and Health Psychology, 63 Park Place, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, CF10 3AT UK.”
Decision making with visualizations: a cognitive framework across disciplines (2018, background): “Some studies suggest that the two types work in parallel while others reveal conflicts between the Types (Sloman, 2002).”
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011, background): “As Kahneman and Frederick made clear in their 2002 paper, this framework of an incorrectly primed initial response that must be overridden fits in nicely with currently popular dual-process frameworks (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008 ;E vans,1984, 2008, 2010 ;E vans & Frankish, 2009; Lieberman, 2007, 2009;”
Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Implications of attitude theories for consumer judgment and decision making (2010, background): “…have emphasized that intuitive/associative “System 1” processes create biases that can be “corrected” by more reflective/rule-based “System 2” processes (Gilbert, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; i.e., that the two systems can generate different answers to the same question, Sloman, 1996, 2002).”
Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making (2006, background): “Habits are also, again indirectly, related to decision making in standard dual-process theories, as they reflect the operation of an evolutionarily older, associative system (Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 2002).”
Legitimacy‐as‐Feeling: How Affect Leads to Vertical Legitimacy Spillovers in Transnational Governance (2014, neutral): “There is significant evidence in judgment and decision-making (Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 2002), social cognition (Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Fiske and Taylor, 2008), and neuroscience research (Greene et al., 2001, Lieberman, 2003) that System 1 processing constitutes the…”
Do People Make Decisions Under Risk Based on Ignorance? An Empirical Test of the Priority Heuristic Against Cumulative Prospect Theory (2008, background): “…apply decision strategies that are based on automatic processes and are part of the intuitive system instead (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; cf. Epstein, 1990; Hogarth, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sloman, 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).”
Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making (2010, background): “, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), (b) models that assume a parallel activation of both kinds of processes (Sloman, 2002), and (c) default-interventionist models which assume that automatic processes are always activated first and that additional deliberate processes are activated only if it is necessary to”
An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes (2011, methodology): “It seems more likely that strategies based on partially automatic processes were used instead (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 2002).”