Towards an Analysis of Onion Routing Security

By Paul F. Syverson, Gene Tsudik, Michael G. Reed, C. Landwehr. Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000

395 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/22598fd83bfa649fba60bee5e8f7b494a78bb576

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Citations in the corpus

Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, neutral): “Tradeoffs between padding protection and cost were discussed, and traffic shapingalgorithms were theorized [49] to provide good security without expensive padding, but no concrete padding scheme was suggested.”
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems (2001, background): “3 Computationsin which participantscomputea public function on their privateinputsandin whichparticipantslearnnothingmorethanwhatthey candeduceform theirown inputandthe resultof thecomputationof thefunction OnionRouting([14], [28]) is anothersystemthatallows anonymousbrowsing.”
Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks (2013, background): “Roughly a decade ago, a number of researchers proposed designs for low-latency, traﬃc-analysis resistant anonymity networks [4, 8, 12, 17, 18, 26, 28].”
Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor (2005, background): “The Onion Router (Tor) [18] is the culmination of many years of research by the Onion Routing project [35] [24] [39].”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, background): “Low-latency systems like Onion Routing aim to provide anonymity against an adversary who is not watching both Alice and Bob [39].”
Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies (2016, background): “(In theory at least: there exist attacks where it is sufficient to control a subset of mixes [169], [171], [172].”
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “In particular, an adversary who can observe the whole network can use end-to-end timing analysis [24,42,45,55] to link two ends of a circuit.”
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries (2013, methodology): “The fraction or number of individual relays has always been a measure of adversary endowment for onion routing systems and is the basis of the c(2)/n(2) risk of individual path compromise (where c is the number out of n relays that are compromised) [20, 38].”
Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Traffic analysis attacks based on packet flow correlation [28,2,1,25] and statistical characteristics of individual mixes [8] have been recognized as a serious threat to low-latency mix networks, but few defenses have been proposed to date.”
Enhancing wireless location privacy using silent period (2005, background): “Other important proposals to establish such anonymous communication channel include Onion Routing[10], Crowds[11], and Anonymizer [12].”
Locating hidden servers (2006, background): “Using random selection of backup and layering entry guard nodes will be an improvement, but as in all Tor circuits, someone connecting through random nodes will always be compromised if an attacker owns just two nodes [25].”
Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems (Extended Abstract) (2004, background): “For example, some research has assumed that timing analysis is possible when dummy messages are not used [20, 21, 19], though this has not been carefully examined.”
DP5: A Private Presence Service (2015, methodology): “The use of an IT-PIR scheme allows operators to increase the security of a DP5 deployment by adding additional servers; in contrast, an onion routing system does not provide such a security parameter: increasing the length of circuits does not improve security due to the end-to-end correlation attac”
Low-resource routing attacks against tor (2007, background): “…questions: (1) how can we minimize the requirements necessary for any adversary to Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and…”
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection (2002, background): “Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection Marc Rennhard Bernhard Plattner Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory Zurich,…”