Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries

By Aaron Johnson, Chris Wacek, Rob Jansen, Michael E. Sherr, Paul F. Syverson. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2013

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f08d37e26906abeee75ca03dc30fd86f53889320

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Citations in the corpus

DP5: A Private Presence Service (2015, background): “Besides the performance problems, anonymous communication channels, be it mixes or onion routers, are susceptible to long-term intersection attacks; in Tor, realistic adversaries are likely to learn a relationship after a few months of repeated connection patterns [32].”
Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies (2016, background): “Even though it is now no longer considered that unlikely by all [Johnson et al. 2013], such an adversary remains a very strong assumption.”
Characterization of Tor Traffic using Time based Features (2017, background): “However, unlike (Johnson et al., 2013; Shmatikov and Wang, 2006), we do not consider any attack models, circuit clogging, or network adversaries, that is beyond the goal of this paper.”
Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things (2017, background): “showed that for an adversary with moderate bandwidth capacity, it only takes 50 to 60 days to include a malicious router to a user’s guard set [92].”
Technical Privacy Metrics (2015, background): “ a communication system can be if the adversary identifiesn out of N of the target’s possible communication partners [6]. Success can also be when the adversary first compromises a communication path [73, 140]. In an onion routing system such as Tor [41], path compromise happens when the adversary c”
Stadium: A Distributed Metadata-Private Messaging System (2017, background): “However, Tor is vulnerable to traffic analysis and injection attacks that can deanonymize users and leak metadata [2, 7, 21, 30, 46].”