Locating hidden servers

By Lasse Øverlier, Paul F. Syverson. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006

398 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4d68c35a3eb989621b43380716d21159874d358c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Ian Goldberg
2. George Danezis
3. Prateek Mittal
4. Vitaly Shmatikov
5. Nikita Borisov
6. Lei Yang
7. Martin Vuagnoux
8. Sylvain Pasini

In Computer Networks and Communications

1. George Danezis
2. Nikita Borisov
3. Vitaly Shmatikov
4. Lei Yang
5. Prateek Mittal
6. Ian Goldberg
7. Martin Vuagnoux
8. Sylvain Pasini

Citations in the corpus

• ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “Guard nodes [51] are a defense against predecessor attacks that is used in the current version of Tor [34].”
• Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network (2008, background): “Since its initial development, researchers have analyzed the system’s performance [2] and security properties [3,4,5,6,7].”
• PIR-Tor: Scalable Anonymous Communication Using Private Information Retrieval (2011, background): “To protect against certain long-term attacks [33] on anonymous communication, each client, when it starts Tor for the first time, selects a set of three guard relays from among fast and stable nodes.”
• Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards (2009, methodology): “[29] SIGBLIPS DSP ENGINEERING.”
• PrivEx: Private Collection of Traffic Statistics for Anonymous Communication Networks (2014, background): “Low-latency anonymity networks are vulnerable to correlation attacks [27,28] that observe traffic volumes entering and leaving the network.”
• Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things (2017, methodology): “The concept of “entry guards” [121] is introduced into the current Tor design to solve this problem following the first direction.”
• Named Data Networking (NDN) Project (2010, methodology): “Using the published known vulnerabilities of TOR [71], we will emulate the same attacks on TORNADO.”
• Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, methodology): “P. Syverson, D. Goldschlag, and M. Reed.”
• Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks (2013, background): “However, Tor is not designed to withstand traffic analysis [9, 20, 23, 29, 32, 33], which means an attacker who can observe the traffic at multiple proxies involved in a Tor circuit (e.g., the ingress and egress proxy) can determine the source and destination of the circuit.”
• Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries (2013, background): “Øverlier and Syverson first demonstrated the practicality of the attack in the context of discovering Tor Hidden Servers [32].”
• Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services (2015, background): “Øverlier and Syverson [32] presented attacks aiming to deanonymize hidden services as follows: the adversary starts by deploying a router in the network, and uses a client which repeatedly attempts to connect to the target hidden service.”
• Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks (2011, background): “, [6, 17, 19, 18], most notable the traffic confirmation attack.”
• Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies (2016, methodology): “This proposal started a discussion [Lists 2014b] that resembles many arguments also used in a very different context, namely the entry selection policy for the Tor anonymity network [Øverlier and Syverson 2006, Elahi et al. 2012, Dingle-dine et al. 2014].”