Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems

By Adam Back, U. Möller, Anton Stiglic. Information Hiding, 2001

299 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/95801b98deb4683014a548f3338a4b06429e2bee

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Citations in the corpus

Spying on the Smart Home: Privacy Attacks and Defenses on Encrypted IoT Traffic (2017, background): “Several such attacks have been demonstrated on anonymity networks [5, 28].”
Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “For detailed lists of attacks, consult [2, 27].”
Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor (2005, background): “When designing such a cover traffic strategy it is also important to keep in mind Wei Dai’s attack [5]: an adversary can try to fill the victim node with their own traffic, trying to eliminate all the cover traffic.”
Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards (2009, background): “are used, see [17, 1].”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, background): “The research community has since introduced many new designs and proofs [1, 14, 16, 19, 28, 29], and discovered a variety of new attacks [3, 5, 6, 9, 23, 35].”
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, unknown): “This tension can be seen in the Java Anon Proxy cascade model, wherein only one node in each cascade needs to handle abuse complaints—but an adversary only needs to observe the entry and exit of a cascade to perform trafﬁc analysis on all that cascade’s users.”
Dummy Traffic against Long Term Intersection Attacks (2002, background): “Longer delays will not be accepted by most users and therefore the anonymity group will shrink [1].”
Vuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis (2015, unknown): “For example, an adversary may learn communication partners by passively observing traffic at each node [13, 28] or by actively delaying some users’ packets to see the effect on others [1].”
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “Another attack relevant to P2P systems is the circuitclogging attack [1, 31], as McLahlan and Hopper [26] observed that, in P2P systems, this attack can reveal the true initiator.”
Locating hidden servers (2006, background): “Since this makes it trivial for any user to bring down the network, it is generally seen as a price few would pay for anonymity, which means that even those who would pay it would be hiding in a very small anonymity set [5, 1].”
Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Traffic analysis attacks based on packet flow correlation [28,2,1,25] and statistical characteristics of individual mixes [8] have been recognized as a serious threat to low-latency mix networks, but few defenses have been proposed to date.”
Towards Statistically Strong Source Anonymity for Sensor Networks (2008, unknown): “According to the classification in [ 6 ], we assume that the adversary is external, global and passive.”