Low-resource routing attacks against tor

By Kevin S. Bauer, Damon McCoy, Dirk Grunwald, Tadayoshi Kohno, D. Sicker. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 2007

374 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f178149e71fb09bf58b2b880937c051afc3efd60

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Citations in the corpus

Stadium: A Distributed Metadata-Private Messaging System (2017, background): “However, Tor is vulnerable to traffic analysis and injection attacks that can deanonymize users and leak metadata [2, 7, 21, 30, 46].”
Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, neutral): “Thus, Tor may informally be viewed as offering a potentially large but weak anonymity set.”
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “The whistleblower could contact a reporter via Tor [27] or another low-latency anonymizing proxy [31], [53], [59], [71], but this would leave the leaker vulnerable to traffic-analysis attacks [4], [60], [61].”
PIR-Tor: Scalable Anonymous Communication Using Private Information Retrieval (2011, background): “Tor network as well as in PIR-Tor, by selectively denying service [4] to circuits that have an honest exit relay (or destination server) and performing end-to-end timing analysis [2] when the exit relay (or destination server) is compromised.”
A vision for technology-mediated support for public participation & assistance in mass emergencies & disasters (2010, background): “…protection (Sicker, 2003), location privacy (Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003), confidentiality, reputation validation (Sicker & McCoy, 2007) and anonymization (Bauer et al., 2007), as they apply to the matters of security, privacy and accuracy in self-organization and peer communication in crisis events.”
Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier (2009, background): “To copyotherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci.c permission and/or a fee.”
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network (2008, background): “Since its initial development, researchers have analyzed the system’s performance [2] and security properties [3,4,5,6,7].”
Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services (2015, background): “Other attacks exploit Tor’s bandwidth-weighted router selection algorithm [5] or its router reliability and availability [7].”
Uncovering social network sybils in the wild (2011, background): “To date, researchers have demonstrated the efﬁcacy of Sybil attacks against P2P systems [9], anonymous communication networks [1], and sensor networks [12].”