Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value

By Cornelius Schmidt, Ruediger Fahlenbrach. 2017

299 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8d236a7dbe064aa9ed9c7ebf5b865a9b43f66ee8

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “12 Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) find that an increase in passive institutional ownership increases board independence while Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016) find no change in board independence and appointments of independent directors are met with worse announcement returns when passive institutio”
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (2016, unknown): “SharkWatch versus other activism datasets Another commonly used dataset in the activism literature is that of Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010).”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, background): “Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find a worsening of governance due to increases in passive ownership.16”
The Big Three and corporate carbon emissions around the world (2020, unknown): “, 2016), payout policy (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2016), CEO power and composition of board of directors (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017), and firm transparency and information production (Boone and White, 2015).”
Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, background): “The results confirm the findings in Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) using a different sample period.”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Another identification strategy uses the 2003 mutual fund scandal, where twenty mutual fund families were prosecuted for late trading; the prosecutions were, at least to some extent, random (Zitzewitz, 2006). This caused the funds to suffer large outflows and thus sell their positions. Crane, Koch, ”
Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure (2020, background): “In addition, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) discuss how passive IOs must oversee a large number of portfolio firms at a low cost, which limits the effectiveness of their monitoring.”
Does common ownership really increase firm coordination? (2020, background): “35 This is consistent with the evidence in Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) who show that,”
How does quasi-indexer ownership affect corporate tax planning? (2019, unknown): “For the second condition, prior studies have shown that quasi-indexer ownership has a causal influence on certain aspects of corporate governance (Appel et al., 2016a; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017) and firm disclosure and information environment (e.”
Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2018, unknown): “Following Fich et al. (2015), Crane et al. (2016) and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), we apply the regression discontinuity design approach and use the Russell index switch indicator variables as instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation framework.”