Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence
By R. Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang, Praveen Kumar. Management Sciences, 2002
442 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21b9ceea3e1f3e3a3b01766cccbc220d454d7e25
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In Accounting
- David F. Larcker
- Yaniv Grinstein
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Paul Hribar
- L. Bebchuk
- Christopher D. Ittner
- Jesse M. Fried
- C. Andres
In Finance
- Yaniv Grinstein
- L. Bebchuk
- David F. Larcker
- Jesse M. Fried
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- I. Bongard
- M. Lehmann
- Paul Hribar
Citations in the corpus
- CEO Compensation and Board Structure (2009, unknown): “Cyert et al. (2002) look at the determinants of executive compensation in the early 1990s in a large sample of U.S. public firms, and they find that CEOs who also are board chairs receive higher compensation.”
- Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues (2005, unknown): “Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), cited earlier.”
- The Growth of Executive Pay (2005, methodology): “…dummies classified by Fama and French (1997).2 Following prior empirical and theoretical work (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Cyert et al., 2002), we also add a measure of firm risk, using the standard deviation of the firm’s monthly returns in the 48 months prior to the…”
- Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels (2012, background): “…of Director characteristics and rules, and shareholder rights, are related to CEO pay levels, with weaker governance associated with excess pay (e.g., Lambert et al., 1993; Borokhovich et al., 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Core et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 2002; Faleye, 2007).”
- Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Ventures (2006, result): “This finding is also consistent with recent empirical studies in large companies (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 2002).”
- Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies (2011, background): “Several papers provide empirical evidence that the share ownership of the largest shareholder is negatively related to the level of compensation: Dyl (1988), Core et al. (1999), Kraft and Niederprum (1999), Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2000), Cyert et al. (2002) for US firms.”
- Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited (2013, methodology): “Following Ferris et al. (2003) and the alternative methodology used by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) we construct three variables that classify boards as busy/not busy based on the number of board appointments held by members of the supervisory board.”
- CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses (2004, background): “Cyert et al. (2002) find that CEOs that are heads of their boards receive higher compensation, and that compensation committees with higher equity stakes tend to reduce the non-salary compensation awarded to the CEO.”