Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

By L. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried. 2005

825 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In their recent book, "Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation", the authors of this article provided a comprehensive critique of U.S. executive pay practices and the corporate governance processes that produce them, and then offered a number of proposals for improving both pay and governance. This article presents an overview of their analysis and proposals. 2005 Morgan Stanley.

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Citations in the corpus

Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation around the World (2013, unknown): “…can empower and incentivize boards of directors in their negotiations with CEOs, potentially increasing accountability, linking firm performance to pay more strongly, and reducing pay levels (e.g., Coates (2009), Bebchuk, Friedman, and Friedman (2007), Davis (2007), Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2005)).”
Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney (2012, background): “That is, most boards are entities in which the sitting CEO has significant influence on choosing new board members (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Thus, researchers have found that most directors have some prior social connection to, or are even close friends with, the existing CEO. Useem (1984) found th”
Management Theory Applications of Prospect Theory: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Opportunities (2011, unknown): “Scholars have also used PT to examine when and how executives decouple their wealth from firm performance, thereby circumventing some of the intended effects of incentive compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006).”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “7 million (including incentive plans) between 1992 and 2000 (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006) and the average CEO compensation in Hong Kong climbed CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions 133”
Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation (2009, background): “Research has shown, however, that corporate elites are highly connected both professionally and socially (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006).”