CEO Compensation and Board Structure

By Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein. 2009

587 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb6fbb87752bb9f51098f1afe9737300604e7e2d

How researchers see this paper

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In Accounting

1. Collins G. Ntim
2. Christopher S. Armstrong
3. W. Guay
4. F. Ferri
5. Yonca Ertimur
6. John E. Core
7. Michel Magnan
8. Luc Renneboog

In Finance

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. W. Guay
3. John E. Core
4. F. Ferri
5. Collins G. Ntim
6. L. Cabeza‐García
7. Dennis Thomas
8. Volkan Muslu

Citations in the corpus

• Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation (2011, unknown): “5 When regressing the level of executive pay on explanatory variables, some papers control for firm fixed effects (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, Frydman and Saks, 2010, Gabaix and Landier, 2008, Hubbard and Palia, 1995, Joskow et al., 1996, Kraft and Niederprum,…”
• Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency (2014, background): “Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we delete firms that are not members of the NYSE or Nasdaq.”
• Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, methodology): “4 Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) exploit this same natural experiment to study the effect of board independence on CEO compensation.”
• CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation (2013, background): “Just as differences among outsiders are important when considering CEO compensation contracts (Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Hallock (1997), and Hwang and Kim (2009)), differences among insiders can be important.”
• Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that the board independence requirements of the new NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules, approved by the SEC in 2009, reduced CEO pay. This reduction was smaller for firms with an outside blockholder or high institutional ownership concentration, suggesting that bloc”
• Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities (2011, unknown): “CEO compensation also decreases after regulatory changes aimed at improving board control (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009).”