Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach

By Jordi Brandts, Arthur Schram. 2001

295 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21af87d14aa67b7a0b0e039aeef0300381b44384

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Citations in the corpus

Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution (2003, background): “The presence of different types of individuals is a common finding in the experimental literature (Brandts and Schram, 2001; Van Winden et al., in press).”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, methodology): “(4) “What was the scope of this experiment (in other words, what were the experimenters trying to discover)?” contributions function approach pioneered in Brandts and Schram (2001).”
Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment (2001, background): “The ‘unconditional contribution’ was just a single decision about how many of the 20 tokens to 2The above-mentioned papers by Croson (1998), Sonnemans et al. (1999), Keser and van Winden (2000) and Brandts and Schram (2001) also investigate ‘conditional cooperation’.”
Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game (2002, background): “…et al., 1996), the relative payoff position of individuals (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), " cooperative gain seeking " (Brandts and Schram, 1996), different sorts of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 1998), "…”
The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation (2002, background): “…1994; Bolton et al., 2000; and Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999) and are also theoretically discussed in reciprocity models (Rabin, 1993), models of ‘unfairness aversion’ (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or by the theory of cooperative gain seekers (Brandts and Schram, 2001).”
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, background): “ing the last few years [Keser and van Winden (2000), Brandts and Schram (2001),”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “Columns [4] and [5] in Table 6 show the contributions of leaders and followers in case a leader has been appointed.”
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, background): “Several studies provided evidence in favour of the existence of conditional cooperation during the last few years (Keser and van Winden 2000, Brandts and Schram 2001, Croson 2000, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001).”
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009, unknown): “All rights reserved. fax: +352 466644 6835. gebauer). erman, 1999; Keser & van Winden, 2000; Brandts & Schram, 2001; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; auer, 2005; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2006; Croson, 2007).”
Reciprocity, matching and conditional Cooperation in two public goods games (2005, background): “…is not necessarily the amount of the public good that is provided (the participant’s own allocation 4 See, e.g., Sugden (1984), Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997), Croson (1998), Sonnemans et al. (1999), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Keser and van Winden (2000), and Brandts and Schram (2001).”
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game (2010, background): “The impact of additional punishing strategies (PC and PD) on structured population was also studied by several research groups [27–29].”
The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, methodology): “Brandts and Schram (2001) use questionnaires to classify people as free riders and cooperators.”