Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

By Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote, Ulrich Schmidt, Malte Loos. 2009

185 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1ef244b0f9f15f5f64bde6973de97a4f879217af

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Citations in the corpus

A tractable model of process fairness under risk (2009, methodology): “The parametric assumptions introduce an egocentric bias in fairness evaluations that has been reported in empirical studies (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Messick & Sentis, 1979, 1985; Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt, & Loos, 2009 ).”
Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas (2018, background): “Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) , Gächter and Renner (2010) and Dufwenberg et al. (2011) also find a highly significantly positive relationship between beliefs and contributions.”
Lifting the veil of ignorance: An experiment on the contagiousness of norm violations (2011, unknown): “Neugebauer et al. (2009) provide further evidence for this mechanism.”
Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, background): “Testing this explicitly, Neugebauer et al. (2009) rejected the hypothesis that strategic play is the driving force of the decay in contributions over time, concluding that “[t]he only viable hypothesis according to our data is the one of conditional cooperation and adaptive belief learning” (op.”
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods (2011, background): “Previous studies of voluntary contributions involving repetition generally find that contributions start between 40 and 60% of the endowment and converge toward the zero-contribution Nash equilibrium (e.g., Andreoni 1988; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Fischbacher and Gachter 2010; Isaac, McCue, and Plott 1”