Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

By Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter, Ernst Fehr. 2001

2,988 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5d99adf84df0915204bc7f1767af89d4f95d8ac1

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Citations in the corpus

Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “This finding implies that the institution of leadership is more likely maintained if it has 14As Fischbacher et al. (2001) suggest, conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation in its own or, in sequential games, as a consequence of some fairness preferences like inequity aversion or…”
Social learning and voluntary cooperation among like-minded people (2005, background): “The conditional cooperators cooperate if sufficiently many others cooperate as well (e.g., Keser and van Winden 2000; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Croson 2002; Falk and Fischbacher 2002; Burlando and Guala 2004; Fischbacher and Gächter 2004).”
The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions (2005, background): “Interestingly, the study does not observe significant numbers of “hump-shaped” contribution profiles observed in Fischbacher et al. (2001) – see the main text of this section.”
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009, background): “8 In contrast to the one-shot strategy method (‘cold’) applied by Fischbacher et al. (2001), we study conditional cooperation with spontaneous decisions (‘hot’).”
Session-effects in the laboratory (2011, neutral): “A typical example is given by Fischbacher et al. (2001) in which they write: “since all subjects played only once, all 44 decisions are independent observations.””
The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, background): “others (e.g., Dawes et al. 1977), or it might be an expression of reciprocity or “conditional cooperation” in general (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gachter 2010 ;C roson2007; Kocher et al. 2008; Muller et al. 2008; Herrmann and Thoni 2009; Neugebauer et al. 2009; Thoni et al. 200”
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field (2009, positive): “For example, Fischbacher et al. (2001) found that about half of their subjects could be classified as conditional cooperators. Similarly, Kurzban and Houser (2005) identify 20 percent of their subjects as free-riders, 13 percent as cooperators and 63 percent as conditional cooperators. The importanc”