Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution

By Marco Casari, Charles R. Plott. 2003

239 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/77238ec1b34a11cbada0d9085e26cd1dc3c641fd

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Citations in the corpus

Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment (2009, background): “Legal systems restrict sanctioning to the violation of shared rules and censor individual attempts to punish socially virtuous actions, hence channeling agents’ punishment attitudes toward beneficial ends for society (Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004; Casari and Plott, 2003).”
A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons (2011, unknown): “DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.013”
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency (2005, unknown): “But in Casari and Plott (2003)Õs common pool resource experiment, punishment is in the form of fines and thus a transfer rather than a deadweight loss, so that efficiency can approach 100%.”
Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis (2007, background): “Scholars are now positing a family of individual models that change the basic assumptions of the classical model (see Rabin, 1993; Ito, Saijo, and Une, 1995; Chan et al., 1997; Levine, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Gintis, 2000; Casari and Plott, 2003; Cox, 2004).”
Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments (2006, background): “1. As an innovation in the punishment literature, Casari and Plott (2003) use sanctions in”
Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, background): “Bowles and Gintis (2002), Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002), and Casari and Plott (2003) provide further evidence on how punishment can have an impact on behavior and social norms. its own payoff at the expense of society.”
Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future (2009, unknown): “Though this behavior is inconsistent with personal income maximization, it has been shown to be remarkably robust (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, Marco Casari and Charles Plott, 2003).”
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources (2006, background): “In a closely related experiment, Casari and Plott (2003) explored whether an institution that had been used in the Italian Alps for centuries and thought to be highly effective would generate positive results in a laboratory setting.”
The Mexican model of community forest management: The role of agrarian policy, forest policy and entrepreneurial organization (2006, background): “There is, however, a much older tradition of community forests managed for timber in Europe, with thousands of such communities in Austria, Italy, and elsewhere (Casari and Plott, 2001; Herbst, 2004).”
The Coevolution of Institutional Entrepreneurship: A Tale of Two Theories (2010, background): “…or groups design communal norms and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., financial penalties, social retribution) to govern a common pool of resources (e.g., Acheson, 1987; Casari, 2007; Casari & Plott, 2003; Ellickson, 1991; Huybers & Bennett, 2003; Oses-Eraso & Viladrich-Grau, 2007; Ostrom, 1990).”