Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning

By Uta Schönberg. Journal of Labor Economics, 2007

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1eadca73d6c98bcf636a32c3446663c164a0aea9

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Citations in the corpus

Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “However, in contrast to Schonberg (2007), she concludes that asymmetric learning is economically and statistically more important than symmetric learning.”
Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures (2014, unknown): “[32] Schönberg, U.”
Asymmetric Information between Employers (2013, background): “For example, Schönberg (2007), the closest to the current paper, looks at whether the relationship between AFQT and earnings increases with rm tenure, controlling for the increased e¤ect of AFQT across levels of experience.”
The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (2012, methodology): “Finally, we limit attention to Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, where we also impose a TremblingHand Perfection assumption on counteroffers (see Selten (1975) for a discussion of Trembling-Hand Perfection).”
Learning by Doing with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Prosper.Com (2011, unknown): “…(see Cohen and Siegelman 2009 for a summary), the default risk of a particular borrower (Sharpe 1990), or the ability of a particular worker (Schonberg 2007) -- while assuming the less informed party has a correct understanding on the statistical distribution of the risk. all the existing…”
Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts (2010, background): “More recent empirical studies include Kahn (2007), Schoenberg (2007), Pinkston (2009), and DeVaro and Waldman (2008) which specifically looks at the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.”