The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence

By Jed DeVaro, Michael Waldman. Journal of Labor Economics, 2012

177 citations recorded by the source corpus.

An extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. We extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium-sized firm in the financial services industry. Our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor’s and master’s degree holders, while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and PhDs is mixed.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/398e56f74ff0dbeefc70485db0b51bb1c7d0d6ff

Citations in the corpus

• Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures (2014, unknown): “The (Kz, Kt)−matrices were implicitly defined in equations (12) and (14) above.”
• Asymmetric Information between Employers (2013, unknown): “V ar( w)stay = V ( (2)L; X; ) + stay + L + X (8)”