Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

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Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision (2012, background): “There have been some experiments in which subjects have been able to choose if they would like to be punished either by each other (Sutter et al., 2010; Ertan et al., 2009; Gurerk et al., 2006; Botelho et al., 2007; Decker et al., 2003) or by a third party (O'Gorman et al.”
Culture and Institutions (2015, background): “47 In a similar vein, Sombart (1976) discusses reasons for the lack of a successful communist party in the United States. investigated to discern interaction between culture and institutions.”
Organ donation in the lab: Preferences and votes on the priority rule (2016, methodology): “For example, Tyran and Feld (2006), Ertan et al. (2010), and Sutter et al. (2010) find that punishment and rewards in public-good games have a larger effect on cooperation when these mechanisms are implemented democratically than when they are imposed exogenously.”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “…effective as second-party punishment in promoting cooperation in all but the final period of fixed length public goods games (Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010), and in indefinitely repeated public goods games (Rand et al., 2009b), while neither reward nor punishment promotes cooperation…”