Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial

By G. Stoneham, V. Chaudhri, Arthur Ha, L. Strappazzon. 2003

547 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/77bf5020e061b1701995b0558f08731f08b69696

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Citations in the corpus

Payments for Ecosystem Services: Rife With Problems and Potential—For Transformation Towards Sustainability (2017, background): “Such flexibility may be partly responsible for the considerable cost-savings that seem to result from such programs (Stoneham et al., 2003; Ajayi, 2012), in part because ES providers may be choosing actions that they already wish to undertake, such that they are willing to perform conservation…”
Payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services for sustained on-farm utilization of plant and animal genetic resources (2011, background): “…a competitive tender approach, farmers have an incentive to apply for conservation contracts close to their real opportunity-costs (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Stoneham et al., 2003), which might be expected to also account for any private non-market values (likely to be positive).”
The efficiency of voluntary incentive policies for preventing biodiversity loss (2009, background): “Lewis and Plantinga (2007) combine an econometric model of landowner decisions with GIS-based landscape simulations to examine the ability of simple incentive policies to reduce habitat fragmentation in South Carolina.”
Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results (2008, background): “As Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) and Stoneham et al. (2003) point out, there can be significant gains from using an auction instead of a fixed-price approach due to the presence of asymmetric information in conservation agreements (see also Ferraro, this issue).”
Adapting auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale (2011, background): “Most ES auctions adopt a sealed bid, discriminatory price mechanism, in which successful landholders are paid their bid price (e.g. Stoneham et al., 2003; Windle et al., 2009).”
Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies (2008, methodology): “One metric used by Stoneham et al. (2003) and White and Burton (2005) is the estimated cost required to achieve auction aggregate environmental benefit with alternative payment policies.”
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services (2008, background): “In Australia, auctions have been proposed to solicit landowner participation to achieve salinity control, nutrient control and biodiversity conservation ( Stoneham et al., 2003 ).”
How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity? (2012, methodology): “Given a fixed budget for contracts, farmers have an incentive to moderate bids if they wish to be awarded such an agreement (Stoneham et al, 2003; Rolfe et al, 2009).”
Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study (2007, methodology): “Stoneham et al. (2003) forcefully demonstrated, using data from the BushTender pilots in Victoria, the superiority of competitive bidding as a contract allocation mechanism.”