GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION AUCTION

By R. Cummings, Charles A. Holt, S. Laury. 2004

152 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Ocean Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee1a920733ad3dde24e0941d53e3f61ee3a9981e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Paul J. Ferraro
2. S. Engel
3. Sven Wunder
4. Allen Blackman
5. María A. Naranjo

In Marketing

1. Paul J. Ferraro

In Ocean Engineering

1. Paul J. Ferraro

Citations in the corpus

• Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services (2008, background): “ Cummings et al. (2004) also believe that reducing the likelihood of poor choices by the landowners reduces the likelihood that landowners will be angry about the auction process and that policymakers will be unhappy about higherthan-expected prices as well as participant anger.”
• A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution (2003, unknown): “[9] also recognize how it is practically impossible to prohibit communications between landholders,”
• Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study (2007, unknown): “environmental or recreational purposes ( Cummings et al., 2003 ).”