The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking

By Thomas R. Eisenmann. 2002

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e1a816320317d524e3260802a29f180742a39a7

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Citations in the corpus

CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology‐intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior‐based incentive schemes (2006, background): “Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1999) note, ‘measuring innovation by simply counting the number of patents issued generates an index of technological progress with a great deal of noise.”
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from Korea (2011, background): “For instance, ownership structure affects important firm-level decisions such as RD Chaganti and Damanpour 1991; Chang 2003; Eisenmann 2002; Hoskisson et al. 2002; Kochhar and David 1996; Zahra 1996).”
Ready, AIM, Acquire: Impression Offsetting and Acquisitions (2015, background): “Although all acquisitions carry significant risk (Eisenmann, 2002), unrelated acquisitions are generally considered riskier (Morck et al.”
Doing the right thing and knowing the right thing to do: why the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (2003, unknown): “…Veliyath, 2002; Wright & Ferris, 1997), unprofitable growth (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000), risk avo idance (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Eisenmann, 2002), and anti-takeover defenses (Holl & Kyriazis, 1997; Kabir, Cantrijn, & Jeunink, 1997; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy,…”
In search of the drivers of high growth in manufacturing SMEs (2006, background): “Eisenmann (2002) states that the level of strategic risk taking behaviour will vary dependant on the ownership structure.”
In the Horns of the Dilemma: Socioemotional Wealth, Financial Wealth, and Acquisitions in Family Firms (2018, methodology): “It would have to adopt new routines that stray from time-proven methods (Eisenmann, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).”
Corporate ownership, equity risk and returns in the People's Republic of China (2008, background): “, 2001; Eisenmann, 2002; Saunders et al., 1990; Staking & Babbel, 1995; Whidbee & Wohar, 1999) support the incentive alignment hypothesis, whereas others (e.g., Agrawal & Mandelker, 1987; Amihud & Lev, 1981) cite evidence consistent with the managerial risk aversion/entrenchment hypothesis. Morck, S”
Consequences of measurement problems in strategic management research: the case of Amihud and Lev (2005, methodology): “Coefficients were statistically significant and in the expected direction for all structural and measurement paths in Figure 1. Overall model measures reported a very good fit: goodness of fit (GFI) was 0.94; the root mean square residual was 0.08; other measures reported comparable fit. The coeffic”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “Another avenue of inquiry might be to investigate the impact of internal organizational complexity, which might make it more difficult for CEOs to manipulate earnings (Eisenmann, 2002).”