Standing out from the crowd: the visibility-enhancing effects of IPO-related signals on alliance formation by entrepreneurial firms

By Timothy G. Pollock, Ranjay Gulati. 2007

242 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/091478efa06ccc1f25cca661179d1d6829882413

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In Management of Technology and Innovation

Citations in the corpus

Market Watch: Information and Availability Cascades Among the Media and Investors in the U.S. IPO Market (2008, background): “…effects on two different types of actions identified by prior research as distinct components of decision making under uncertainty: allocation of attention and evaluation (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007; Zuckerman, 1999).”
Which of These Things Are Not Like the Others? Comparing the Rational, Emotional, and Moral Aspects of Reputation, Status, Celebrity, and Stigma (2019, background): “…volume of either media or analyst coverage (Collet & Philippe, 2014; van de Rijt, Shor, Ward, & Skiena, 2013) because they do not capture firms’ relative standings in a social hierarchy and result from rather than reflect high-status affiliations (Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Shen, Tang, & Chen, 2014).”
Unmixed signals: How reputation and status affect alliance formation (2014, background): “Nonetheless, management scholars have generally focused on positive quality signals and the benefits they can provide (e.g., Higgins et al., 2011; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008; Pollock and Gulati, 2007), paying little attention to the role of negative quality signals.”
How Do Social Defenses Work? A Resource-Dependence Lens on Technology Ventures, Venture Capital Investors, and Corporate Relationships (2014, background): “…desirable partners themselves because they occupy valuable network positions: they are implicitly of high quality and regarded well by others, and consequently confer prestige on those firms with which they connect (Podolny, 1993; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Pollock & Gulati, 2007).”
Getting What You Need: How Reputation and Status Affect Team Performance, Hiring, and Salaries in the NBA (2013, background): “…to work with or employ high-status actors because by using their resources or employing them, an organization can increase its own status, consequently enjoying the benefits associated with it (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Pollock et al., 2010; Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).”
Completing the technology transfer process: M&As of science-based IPOs (2012, unknown): “Such signals include corporate governance characteristics (Certo 2003), upper echelon prestige (Pollock and Gulati 2007), founder presence (Nelson 2003), and winning certification contests (Rao 1994).”
Why 'Good' Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality (2010, unknown): “about a firm’s ability to provide value to a relationship (e.g., Pollock & Gulati, 2007 ), the”
Mind the Gap: The Interplay Between External and Internal Actions in the Case of Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, background): “Third, Analyst Coverage, measured as the number of analysts that cover a focal firm in each year, is a well-established measure from the accounting and finance literatures that controls for firm visibility (Pollock & Gulati, 2007).”
Valuing University–Based Firms: The Effects of Academic Affiliation on IPO Performance (2011, background): “…include corporate governance characteristics (Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, Canella, & Dalton, 2003), upper echelon prestige (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Pollock & Gulati, 2007), founder presence (Nelson, 2003), celebrity endorsements (Dean & Biswas, 2001), certification contests (Rao, 1994), and…”
Better Together? Signaling Interactions in New Venture Pursuit of Initial External Capital (2016, background): “…asymmetry (Sanders & Boivie, 2004), affiliation with reliable third parties can help reduce uncertainty about a startup by endorsing the quality of the venture and affording it a measure of legitimacy (Jain, Jayaraman, & Kini, 2008; Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).”
Value from gestalt: how sequences of competitive actions create advantage for firms in nascent markets (2010, background): “Investor valuations in this sector also revealed multiplicity of interpretations and high levels of debate about the value of different firm strategies (Amit and Zott, 2001; Pollock and Gulati, 2007).”
Hidden Badge of Honor: How Contextual Distinctiveness Affects Category Promotion among Certified B Corporations (2017, unknown): “…the correlation between regional public companies and regional category peers was .96, we partialed out their common variance by regressing regional category peers on regional public companies and then used the residuals in our analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Pollock & Gulati, 2007).”
Domestic alliance network to attract foreign partners: Evidence from international joint ventures in China (2014, background): “The level of visibility, as prior literature shows, may influence the likelihood of inclusion in the “consideration set” (Roberts & Lattin, 1997) of organizations that could, for instance, become valuable alliance partners (Pollock & Gulati, 2007).”