Shuhei Kurizaki
American Political Science Review · 2007
A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Whom Shuhei Kurizaki trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
Papers from Shuhei Kurizaki's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Shuhei Kurizaki trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States (American Political Science Review)
- Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
- The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information (American Political Science Review)
- How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Consumption--Savings Decisions with Quasi--Geometric Discounting
- Self-Control for the Righteous: Toward a Theory of Precommitment to Indulgence
- Incentives to Exercise
- Paying Not to Go to the Gym
- Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan
Their papers
- Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy (2007) — 149 citations