The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy

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Environmental Innovations, Local Networks and Internationalization (2012, background): “Accordingly, international trade and foreign direct investments (FDIs) are assumed to be channels through which firms exploit asymmetries in international environmental regulations (Wagner, 2001).”
Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, background): “For a survey see for instance Folmer and de Zeeuw (1999, 2000), Folmer and van Mouche (2000), Finus (2001, 2003a), Wagner (2001), and Barrett (2003), Bohringer and Finus (2005).”
Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, background): “Other references on the use of noncooperative game theory for creating an IEA are [42, 65, 77, 78, 201].”
A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements (2010, background): “There is no supra-national authority that forces countries to participate to an agreement, as well as there is no international environmental judicial system powerful enough to guarantee compliance to an IEA [17, 36, 19].”
Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes (2013, unknown): “Wagner [26], and Barrett [6,7].”