Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity

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Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements (2012, background): “…and Carraro, 1997; Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 1996); reputation effects (Jeppensen and Andersen, 1998, Hoel and Schneider, 1997); fairness concerns (Lange and Vogt, 2003); linkage strategies (Barrett, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997); minimum Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal…”
Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, background): “Apart from the difficulty to reach general conclusions about the role of inequality aversion in the models by Lange and Vogt (2003) and Peters and Schuler (2006), there are at least two more problems.”
The behavioural economics of climate change (2008, background): “Although a preference for equity may improve the possibilities for cooperation in climate negotiations (see Lange and Vogt, 2003), this is much less clear when the equity principles used are influenced by self-serving bias (Lange et al., 2007).”
Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics (2010, background): “Lange and Vogt (2003), on the other hand, show that, when countries care not only about their own absolute payoffs but also about fairness, the coalition size tends to be larger, and even the grand coalition (that includes all countries) can be stable.”