Paul V. Warwick

Economics and Econometrics · 2001–2006

A researcher in the Science corpus: 3 papers; trusts 8 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom Paul V. Warwick trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Dennis Leech
  2. Guillaume R. Fréchette
  3. J. Snyder
  4. James N. Druckman
  5. John H. Kagel
  6. Michael M. Ting
  7. Stephen Ansolabehere
  8. Massimo Morelli
  9. Andrew Gelman

Who trusts Paul V. Warwick overall

  1. James N. Druckman
  2. Guillaume R. Fréchette
  3. Royce Carroll
  4. John H. Kagel

Papers from Paul V. Warwick's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Paul V. Warwick trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments (British Journal of Political Science)
  2. Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting
  3. An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices
  4. Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules (American Political Science Review)
  5. Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
  6. Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis (British Journal of Political Science)
  7. The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies
  8. A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (American Political Science Review)
  9. An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures
  10. Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics (American Political Science Review)

Their papers