An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures

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Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies (2011, background): “The weights of different portfolios are drawn from the Druckman and Warwick (2005) expert survey.”
Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting (2005, background): “26 On the other hand, Diermeier and Merlo (2004) provide evidence that the assumption of random recognition with probabilities proportional to seat shares provides a good first approximation to the frequency with which parties act as formateur. ate.”
Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining (2005, methodology): “We limit ourselves to treatments EWES and UWUS because they both employ nominally proportional selection rules for recognizing proposals, the pattern found with respect to government formateur rules in field data (Diermeier and Merlo, 2004).”
Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation (2000, background): “…on the parties’ electoral policy platforms u, 5 The assumption that recognition probabilities are given by vote shares has some empirical support (see Diermeier and Merlo 1999). proportional representation 1247 and for any party J, let denote the legislative equilibrium out-∗t(t (t ))J 0 come…”