A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
By Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan. American Political Science Review, 2000
422 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8047ca417dfc756869534d016af997da01ed4c4c
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Brian G. Knight
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- Norman Schofield
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In Management Science and Operations Research
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Citations in the corpus
- Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress* (2008, background): “…(Chari et al., 1997; Coate, 1997), legislative seniority (McKelvey and Riezman, 1992), pork barrel inefficiencies (Baron, 1991), social choice (Banks and Duggan, 2000), special interest politics (Persson, 1998; Helpman and Persson, 2001; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2001), tax expenditures…”
- Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules (2002, background): “, 1997), fiscal discipline in governments (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, Alesina et al, 1997), special interest politics (Persson, 1998, Bennedsen and Feldman, 2001), the effects of restrictive legislative procedures (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Huber, 1992), interactions between legislative and executiv”
- A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making (2006, background): “5 In Banks and Duggan (1999), we prove that LSWP holds in two general models, from which all of the examples below can be obtained as special cases.”
- Fifty years of the nash program,1953-2003 (2004, background): “A partial list of these and related contributions includes the following papers: Alcalde, Perez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina (1998), Aumann (1959, 1961 -Section 10-), Banks and Duggan (2000) , Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Bergin and Duggan (1999), Bloch (1996), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Evans (1997), ”
- Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods (2007, background): “One such approach is developed by Banks and Duggan (2000, 2005) who provide a flexible framework encompassing a broad array of legislative policymaking models, including simultaneous spending choices across different types of goods.”
- Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter? (2003, background): “Supermajority rules, such as the cloture requirement in the U.S. Senate, can create small-state biases.”
- Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining (2005, methodology): “The Baron-Ferejohn model has been applied to a number of situations, sometimes outside the realm of legislative bargaining per se, ranging from special interest politics (Bennedsen and Feldman 2001; Persson 1998) to social choice issues (Banks and Duggan 2000).”
- Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting (2005, methodology): “In the other, party A has 34 seats, party B has 34 seats, and party C has 33 seats.”
- Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty? (2005, background): “356 Banks & Duggan 2000 ). If party leaders are aware of the fact that they can control policy from the core, then this ‘centripetal’ pressure should lead parties to position themselves at the center.”