Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

By J. Snyder, Michael M. Ting, Stephen Ansolabehere. 2005

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8d65f4444a87b9f4fd1274c02edf581fd69895aa

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Citations in the corpus

Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis (2002, background): “Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2001) have demonstratedsimilar problemsof voting powerindexes withgame theory.”
Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress* (2008, background): “Snyder et al. (2003) develop such a model and find that a small state bias emerges if the Senate has proposal power or if federal dollars fund statewide public goods.”
The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship (2006, methodology): “Ansolabehere et al. (2005) and Snyder et al. (2003) support their case by demonstrating that a significant net effect is exercised on the quantitative allocation of portfolio shares by the formateur status dummy.”