Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

By N. McCarty. American Political Science Review, 2000

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Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter? (2003, background): “We 7 See, e.g., Diermeier and Feddersen 1998, LeBlanc, Snyder, and Tripathi 2000, McCarty 2000, and Winter 1996.”
Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting (2005, methodology): “…Nathan Dietz (1996), Eyal Winter (1996), V. V. Chari et al. (1997), Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen (1998), Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan (2000), William LeBlanc et al. (2000), Nolan M. McCarty (2000a, 2000b), Hulya Eraslan (2002), Peter Norman (2002), and Ansolabehere et al. (2003).”
Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds (2009, unknown): “The case of φ = 0, equation (10), reduces to the linear model in equation (4) with α ≈ β.11”
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules (2002, background): “, 1997), fiscal discipline in governments (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, Alesina et al, 1997), special interest politics (Persson, 1998, Bennedsen and Feldman, 2001), the effects of restrictive legislative procedures (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Huber, 1992), interactions between legislative and executiv”