M. Serna

Management Science and Operations Research · 2012

A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 6 researchers and is trusted by 36 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 14 citations into it; #979 of 11,946 by trust here, #2,539 by citations
• Marketing — 12 citations into it
• Economics and Econometrics — 10 citations into it

Whom M. Serna trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Lawrence M. Ausubel
2. Noam Nisan
3. Paul R. Milgrom
4. D. Parkes
5. Sushil Bikhchandani
6. Roger B. Myerson
7. Martin L. Puterman
8. Uriel Feige
9. David Zuckerman
10. Daniel J. Lehmann

Who trusts M. Serna overall

1. Ludek Cigler
2. L. Elisa Celis
3. Naveen Kodali
4. Nguyen Cong Luong
5. Dinh Thai Hoang
6. Sridhar Mahadevan
7. Wenbo Wang
8. Boi Faltings
9. Anay Mehrotra
10. Jacob D. Abernethy

Papers from M. Serna's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers M. Serna trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
2. Optimal Auction Design
3. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
4. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
5. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
6. The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities (Journal of Economics Theory)
7. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (JACM)
8. Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
9. A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (Management Sciences)
10. The use of knowledge about society

Their papers

• Algorithmic Game Theory (2012) — 3,487 citations