The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities
By Faruk Gul, E. Stacchetti. Journal of Economics Theory, 2000
357 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/94336f75af42cd2b0c1b8e34a6c93e9aa192c76e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Kazuo Murota
- Noam Nisan
- Akihisa Tamura
- Akiyoshi Shioura
- Teodor Gabriel Crainic
- Michel Gendreau
- Jawad Abrache
- Monia Rekik
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Kazuo Murota
- Noam Nisan
- Akihisa Tamura
- Akiyoshi Shioura
- Daniel J. Lehmann
- Teodor Gabriel Crainic
- Michel Gendreau
- Jawad Abrache
Citations in the corpus
- GROSS SUBSTITUTES CONDITION AND DISCRETE CONCAVITY FOR MULTI-UNIT VALUATIONS: A SURVEY (2015, methodology): “, an algorithm) to compute an equilibrium (see also [18]).”
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2006, neutral): “Deterministic protocols achieving this were proposed in [3,9,14,34].”
- Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism (2013, background): “Gül and Stacchetti 2000Þ, an important feature that is also shared by COSM under Bf YC priorities.”
- An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities (2006, methodology): “Ausubel (1996) makes a first attempt to extend the design from homogeneous to 4 The precise statement of Theorem 6 of Gul and Stacchetti (2000) only excludes implementing literally the Vickrey-Clarke- Groves (VCG) outcome by an auction in which price traces a single ascending trajectory.”
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2001, background): “Recent papers dealing with combinatorial auctions such as [7, 8, 9, 1] usually assume the gross substitutes property.”
- Combinatorial auctions (2007, positive): “Among the most important developments recently reported, we may cite (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000) who show that, under the GS condition, a simple tâtonnement process that generalizes the English auction leads to the smallest Walrasian prices, which in turn correspond to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payme”
- Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, background): “Another such example is a class of multimodular functions in Hajek (1985) which are used in discrete-event control (Altman et al.”