Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance
By K. Lee, Baruch Lev, Gillian Yeo. 2008
232 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fb460286f6676b964ca3b50b49229c2a779599b8
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Citations in the corpus
- The association between integrated reporting and firm valuation (2015, unknown): “The governance literature generally suggests that as boards become increasingly independent of managers, their monitoring effectiveness increases, thereby decreasing managerial opportunism and enhancing firm performance (Gelb 2000; Perry and Peyer 2005; Linck et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008, 2009).”
- 6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “Work by Lee, Shakespeare, and Walsh ( 2008 ) indicates that the story could be more complex, as they found that CEOs engaging in both acquisition and divestiture of assets (what Lee et al.”
- Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and Its Relation to Firm Performance (2019, background): “…and labor 1 For example, corporate pay disparity among managers and executives has been shown to be both positively (Main, O’Reilly, and Wade 1993; Lee, Lev, and Yeo 2008; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009) and negatively (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011) related to accounting performance and…”