The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults

By Á. Kovács, Ernő Téglás, Ansgar D. Endress. Science, 2010

783 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/11c11b9488892dbc9c6c40621cc8795cdb0e68b1

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Citations in the corpus

Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers (2013, neutral): “…appreciate the critical at University of British Columbia Library on October 29, 2014cdp.sagepub.comDownloaded from role that mental states play in others’ actions, if they are tested with developmentally appropriate methodologies (e.g., Kovacs et al., 2010; Luo, 2011; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005).”
Do infants understand false beliefs? We don’t know yet – A commentary on Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate’s commentary (2018, background): “across different age groups and populations because similarities and/or differences in response profiles that persist over vast differences in experiences can illuminate how tasks are being interpreted and, further, help characterize diverse mental models of the psychological and physical worlds tha”
Evaluating large language models in theory of mind tasks (2023, background): “It develops early in human life ( 10 – 12 ) and is so critical that its dysfunctions characterize a multitude of psychiatric disorders, including autism, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and psychop-athy ( 13 – 15 ).”
Belief-based action prediction in preverbal infants (2014, background): “For example, in Kovacs and colleagues study, belief sensitivity manifested as interference: infants own representation of the location of a hidden object seemed to be influenced by what they knew of the others’ representation of the object (Kovacs et al., 2010).”
Two Systems for Mindreading? (2016, methodology): “Kovács et al. (2010) provide evidence that adults automatically compute what another agent will falsely believe about a display (or at least, falsely register), with the resulting information interfering with the participants’ own expectations about the situation.”
Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, result): “The results described above, together with those of Kovács et al. (2010) and Luo (2011a), support two conclusions.”
To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “Indeed, the earliest age at which infants pass a false belief task is 7 months (Kovács et al., 2010).”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “Thus Leslie and Polizzi (1998) postulated a ‘selection processor’ that was slow to mature; and Birch and Bloom (2004) appealed to ‘the curse of knowledge’ combined with immature executive function.”
At 6–9 months, human infants know the meanings of many common nouns (2012, neutral): “sophistication in social cognition (30, 31).”