Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options

By Kevin J. Murphy. 2002

328 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f74ed4d5b5eea56ff0ae9ad2f54fa28d7dd410b3

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Citations in the corpus

Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, neutral): “…and prevent managers from setting their own pay.4 However, disclosed information on the compensation of peer CEOs may actually help 1 For example, Murphy (2002), Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Oyer (2004), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans and Gabaix (2009), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), Core…”
The Institutions of Corporate Governance (2005, neutral): “Hall & Liebman (1998); Murphy (2002).”
Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis (2010, background): “Advocates can point to individual studies confirming agency theory predictions (e.g., Abowd & Kaplan, 1999; Devers, Cannella, Reilly & Yoder, 2007; Murphy, 2002; Vafeas, 1999) while critics can point to studies that either fail to confirm predictions or provide contradictory evidence (e.g., Bebchuk…”
CEO Compensation and Company Performance (2011, background): “According to these studies, executive compensation levels are mostly consistent with good corporate governance and any distortions result from the perceived impact of accounting and tax rules, and any problem with pay is peculiar to an individual company and is not a general problem [13, 14].”
Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, neutral): “Further, our findings are consistent with studies demonstrating that executive entrenchment at the full board and compensation committee level does not, of itself, contribute to the uncoupling of CEO pay from firm performance (Conyon, 2006; Dalton et al., 1998; Murphy, 2002).”
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (2004, methodology): “See Murphy (2002) for an extensive discussion of the Bebchuk, Fried and Walker arguments.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “3Black-Scholes values are likely to overstate both the cost of option compensation to the rm and its value to the executive (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 1998; Hall and Murphy, 2002; Ingersoll, 2006; Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace, 2010).”