Iago attacks: why the system call API is a bad untrusted RPC interface

By Stephen Checkoway, Hovav Shacham. International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, 2013

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f5570538f90c26089578035dd7a6d8472168d5d1

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Citations in the corpus

AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves (2016, background): “Furthermore, Haven tries to defend against Iago attacks be sanitising and checking the parameters of Ecalls and results of Ocalls.”
This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (positive): “When executing on a different platform provider, Ryoan provides protections against a malicious OS, e.g., system call validation to prevent Iago attacks [28] (similar to Haven [21], Inktag [40], and Sego [46]) and encryption to protect data secrecy.”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, methodology): “We assume a secure source of random numbers (which recent processors provide).”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, neutral): “Iago attacks [6] exploit this limitation.”
SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017, background): “Attackers can perform various types of Iago attacks [19] through the communication channel between the enclave program and the external world.”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, background): “We must note that even though we concentrate on memory safety, there are other, insider attack vectors (orthogonal to our work) where a malicious OS tries to deceive the shielded application [30, 60, 71, 83].”
SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “This side channel discloses information about the TEE execution; (ii) compromise integrity: the adversary may modify the input/output parameters of host calls, repeatedly perform arbitrary host calls or interfere with their execution outside of the TEE [19].”
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, background): “Keystone can utilize existing defenses to prevent Iago attacks [32] via this interface [31, 73, 82].”
Chiron: Privacy-preserving Machine Learning as a Service (2018, background): “Finally, it protects against all currently known Iago attacks [30].”
Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu (2017, background): “Previous work has shown, for example, that the untrusted OS might be able to compromise a shielded execution by manipulating the return values to system calls that it invokes [8].”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, background): “Therefore, if there is no I/O device generating many interrupts and an enclave program generates less frequent system calls, which would be desired to avoid the Iago attack [9], flushing branch states for every enclave context switch will introduce negligible overhead.”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, methodology): “Checkoway and Shachman [18] demonstrate the subtlety of detecting semantic attacks via the POSIX interface.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “As shown in [17] such interactions with the operating system may give rise to Iago attacks unless they are carefully validated.”
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16). (neutral): “This check protects the enclave from memory-based Iago attacks [12] and is performed for all shield libraries.”
Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets (2016, background): “Our defenses do not prevent information leakage via untrusted I/O, system-call, and filesystem channels [17].”