Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on DC State Estimation

By R. Bobba, Katherine M. Rogers, Qiyan Wang, Himanshu Khurana, Klara Nahrstedt, Thomas J. Overbye. 2010

478 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f27051af5bd840233fc47fb10e5311a22ff64139

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Citations in the corpus

Distributed Internet-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Smart Power Grids (2011, background): “…data injection attacks against state estimation, the hackers attempt to compromise measurement sensors or break into the routers that relay the measured data towards the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in order to insert errors into certain state variable estimations [6].”
A novel method to detect bad data injection attack in smart grid (2013, background): “Bobba et al. [9] explored the detection of false data injection attacks proposed by Liu et.al [2] through protecting a strategically selected set of sensor measurements and by having a way to independently verify or measure the values of a strategically selected set of state variables.”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids (2011, background): “There exists a concurrent work [Bobba et al. 2010] that also points to the existence of generalized false data injection attacks.”
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey (2012, unknown): “A. Information Metering and Measurement Study in information metering and measurement can be classified into smart metering, and smart monitoring and measurement as shown in Fig.”
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid (2011, background): “The authors of [16] found that, in order to protect a network against all unobservable attacks , a minimum size set of measurements that by themselves ensure observability need to be included.”
Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems (2010, background): “More recently in [6], [7], further aspects”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “In one approach to detecting such an attack, one can use a small, strategically selected set of tamper-resistant meters to provide independent measurements [136].”
Detection of Faults and Attacks Including False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid Using Kalman Filter (2014, background): “Similarly, the protection for the set of meter measurements or changes was discussed in [13] and [14].”
Detection of false data injection attacks in smart-grid systems (2015, background): “Although some approaches try to solve this problem, such as [7], they are unable to guarantee the security of smart-grid systems, since they are limited to traditional power grid scenarios, where adversaries can only assess physical meters.”
Defending Against False Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation (2017, background): “In particular, we intend to provide insightful guidance on how to deploy the least defense budget to guarantee that the attacker cannot modify any set of state variables.”
Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011, background): “Notable exceptions are the study of false data-injection attacks to state estimation in power grids [40–45], and electricity markets [46].”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “Targeted systems Impact References DC SCADA Invalid state estimation [39] [41] [43] [40] AC SCADA Invalid state estimation [42] [52] [59] Electric market Potential financial losses [58] [57] be authenticated to the communication networks or the grid, and have the access to sensitive information.”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids (2009, background): “There exists a concurrent work [Bobba et al. 2010] that also points to the existence of generalized false data injection attacks.”
Cyber Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Grids (2012, methodology): “In [55], encryption was used to protect a state estimator from attacks.”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, unknown): “Further work includes [10, 29, 46, 84, 90, 100, 108].”
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, background): “[14] proved that it is necessary and sufficient to protect a set of basic measurements in order to be able to detect FDIAs.”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, methodology): “[44] first try a straightforward brute-force approach to identify optimal P and Q, by searching through C m C n combinations for all possible choices of p and q.”