Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response
By Alvaro A. Cárdenas, Saurabh Amin, Zong-Syun Lin, Yu-Lun Huang, Chi-Yen Huang, S. Sastry. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2011
804 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1bb7a30f11186a8699b89d0955140e9bfe1a39d0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- André M. H. Teixeira
- Henrik Sandberg
- Kin Cheong Sou
- Arsalan Mosenia
- Ali Chehab
- Chen Peng
- Haider Abbas
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- André M. H. Teixeira
- Henrik Sandberg
- Hongtao Sun
- Kin Cheong Sou
- Chen Peng
- Kyoung-Dae Kim
- Arsalan Mosenia
In Control and Systems Engineering
- André M. H. Teixeira
- Henrik Sandberg
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- Iman Shames
- Kin Cheong Sou
- Hongtao Sun
- Chen Peng
- Anuradha M. Annaswamy
Citations in the corpus
- Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “Applications include water control systems [21], state estimation in the power grid [35,36], boilers in power plants [67], chemical process control [10], electricity consumption data from smart meters [40], and a variety of industrial control systems [42].”
- A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016, methodology): “In Cardenas et al. (2011), the standard formula for calculating risk as an average loss is accepted and interpreted in the context of a sensor network: where p i is the probability of an attacker compromising sensor i and is accepted to be the same for all sensors and L i is a loss resulting from…”
- Review of Security Issues in Industrial Networks (2013, positive): “Models and experiments presented in [59] show the feasibility of the proposed solution, at least for the kind of control systems considered, although a lot of work has still to be done in this direction.”
- A systems and control perspective of CPS security (2019, background): “Earlier works such as [6]–[8], [37] brought to attention the fact that the topic of cyber-attacks is not of interest just to the cybersecurity community, but out of significantly broader interest.”
- Cyber–Physical Systems: A Perspective at the Centennial (2012, background): “Computer attacks can be detected by incorporating knowledge of the physical system under control [254].”
- Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, background): “…consequently makes wrong decisions; (2) using the meter as “bot” to launch attacks possibly against other smart meters or systems within the smart grid network; and (3) the meter’s collected data could be tampered with so that the bill reflects false data to reduce the cost to the consumer [137].”
- A Survey on Security Communication and Control for Smart Grids Under Malicious Cyber Attacks (2019, methodology): “Besides, with the aim to fully utilize the acquired data flexibly, sequential detection theory is considered in [84].”
- Cyber physical systems security: Analysis, challenges and solutions (2017, background): “Control security encompasses resolving any control issues in the network environment and mitigating the control system from any attacks on system estimation and control algorithms (Cárdenas et al., 2011; Lu et al., 2013).”
- Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, background): “Various attack scenarios are evaluated on real and simulated benchmark systems in [13] and [14], respectively.”
- Cyber-physical systems security: Limitations, issues and future trends (2020, positive): “Thus, requesting to prioritize security defences against integrity attacks due to their effectiveness to overcome DoS attacks only [300].”
- Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems (2012, background): “Several instances of this scenario have been considered in the context of control systems, see [6], [7], [8] and references therein.”
- SWaT: a water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS security (2016, background): “Mechanisms for defending an ICS against attacks have also been proposed.”
- Cybersecurity for industrial control systems: A survey (2020, methodology): “[62] have performed a risk assessment for SCADA systems and discussed various attack models with experiments.”
- A Comprehensive Study of Security of Internet-of-Things (2017, background): “Therefore, the system does not shut down even in an emergency situation [36], [37].”
- Cloud-Assisted IoT-Based SCADA Systems Security: A Review of the State of the Art and Future Challenges (2016, methodology): “[27] presented a methodology that detects such attacks by monitoring and analyzing the physical system under observation.”