False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids

By Yao Liu, Michael K. Reiter, Peng Ning. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2009

2,100 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7cee808bdacee62770bae90e0a85f5c04be9019e

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Citations in the corpus

Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems (2013, methodology): “In contrary, as shown in [9], a cyber attack may remain undetected by a static procedure if it compromises as few as four measurements.”
Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks (2013, background): “While recent efforts have focused on applying IT security solutions to NCS, these solutions do not directly address the risks due to an intelligent attacker who is capable of compromising sensor-control data [3],[4].”
Machine Learning Methods for Attack Detection in the Smart Grid (2015, methodology): “It is worth noting that the values of κ at which the phase transition occurs correspond to the minimum number of measurement variables, κ, that the attacker needs to compromise in order to construct unobservable attacks [7].”
Detection of Faults and Attacks Including False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid Using Kalman Filter (2014, methodology): “Recently, many emerging attacks specifically targeting the communication and control systems in smart grid are exposed [3]–[8].”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in wireless sensor networks (2010, background): “study estimation schemes in power grids and show how the attacker could potentially modify state estimates without being detected [12].”
Dependable Demand Response Management in the Smart Grid: A Stackelberg Game Approach (2013, background): “However, the data communications in the smart grid may suffer attacks such as data manipulation or false data injection [17] from malicious nodes.”
A systems and control perspective of CPS security (2019, methodology): “1) occur, references [37], [178]–[181] propose a solution based on robust signal processing techniques such as Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) to minimize the residue.”
A Survey on Industrial Internet of Things: A Cyber-Physical Systems Perspective (2018, background): “I-IoT systems valuable targets for attackers [2], [14], [105], [121]–[126].”
A Survey on Cyber Security for Smart Grid Communications (2012, background): “A notable example is the recent work [42], which proposed a new type of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against the state estimation in the power grid.”
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, background): “Liu et al. [94] demonstrated a simulated false data injection to evaluate the impact on the state estimation in smart grids.”
Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service (2015, neutral): “The former affect the trustworthiness of data by manipulating the packets transmitted over the network; see [5]–[9] and the references therein.”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, methodology): “As we discussed before, the line of research started by false data injection attacks for state estimation in the power grid [60, 61] focuses on developing new ways to find attacks or to find new undetectable attacks; however, they tend to ignore the evaluation of the system under normal conditions…”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “…power equipments at the SCADA center 3 SCADA and wide-area power systems Multi-hop, hierarchical State estimation or synchronization based on measurements from raw data samples (e.g., from PMUs) per of data or samples can easily be identified by the data-integrity detector at the SCADA center [39].”
Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems (2011, background): “False data injection attacks [10], one type of cyber attacks against state estimation through SCADA systems, are getting more attention as the smart grid develops.”
Distributed Robust Power System State Estimation (2012, background): “Stealth attack s in power meter infrastructure are studied in [19], [16].”