False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids

By Yao Liu, Peng Ning, Michael K. Reiter. TSEC, 2011

1,365 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/344ffc5019af118fac8d840016788abe1480e5dc

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Citations in the corpus

Detection of false data injection attacks in smart-grid systems (2015, background): “Therefore, energy distribution (which controls the energy generation, consumption, and transmission processes) can be performed in a more dynamic and efficient manner [2, 3].”
BlackIoT: IoT Botnet of High Wattage Devices Can Disrupt the Power Grid (2018, methodology): “Theoretical methods for detecting cyber attacks on power grids and recovering information after such attacks have also been developed [15, 20, 37, 39, 40, 55].”
A Survey on Security Communication and Control for Smart Grids Under Malicious Cyber Attacks (2019, methodology): “These detection methods can be used in SG [79], [83].”
Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (2009, background): “For example, an adversary that attempts to cause rolling blackouts [7,8] may have a sub-goal of forging energy demand at distribution substation meters.”
Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis (2013, background): “Meanwhile, malicious attack against measurement data, namely false data injection attack (FDIA) has been studied in [14], [18], [26].”
Distributed Blockchain-Based Data Protection Framework for Modern Power Systems Against Cyber Attacks (2019, background): “As a representative cyber-attack, the false data injection attack (FDIA) [6]–[8] manipulates system data to mislead the control center without being detected by the bad data detection module.”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, methodology): “As we discussed before, the line of research started by false data injection attacks for state estimation in the power grid [60, 61] focuses on developing new ways to find attacks or to find new undetectable attacks; however, they tend to ignore the evaluation of the system under normal conditions…”
Cyber-security in smart grid: Survey and challenges (2018, methodology): “nd for the energy management system (EMS) to process a real-time data collected by the SCADA system, FDI attack could compromise the SE’s integrity leading to the instability of the smart grid system [40]. A detailed study on the impact of the FDI attack on the power system stability was conducted b”
Application of Big Data and Machine Learning in Smart Grid, and Associated Security Concerns: A Review (2019, background): “The state estimation can be stated as below [205]:”
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, background): “minimum-Resource Attacks There is a significant amount of literature studying the stealthy attack (7) and its consequences to state-estimation data integrity (for example, [15] and [44]–[49]).”
Attack models and scenarios for networked control systems (2012, background): “For instance, in the case of power networks, an attacker with perfect model knowledge has been initially considered in [13].”
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in AC State Estimation (2015, background): “It is found in [7] that a new type of cyber-attack called false data injection attack can pass the traditional bad data detection in power system state estimation.”
Control-Theoretic Methods for Cyberphysical Security: Geometric Principles for Optimal Cross-Layer Resilient Control Systems (2015, background): “116 IEEE CONTROL SYSTEMS MAGAZINE » FEBRUARY 2015 fuNdAMENTAL ATTACk dETECTION ANd IdENTIfICATION LIMITATIONS In this section, system- and graph-theoretic conditions for the detectability and identifiability of attacks are presented.”
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, methodology): “1) State Estimation: The basic principle of state estimation is to infer the operational state of the power system from available measurements of the power network equipped with various meters [10].”