Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems

By György Dán, Henrik Sandberg. 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, 2010

425 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/df76a7e6288a952439c420385011cbb09d9bcf9d

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Citations in the corpus

Event-Triggered State Observers for Sparse Sensor Noise/Attacks (2013, background): “The results reported in [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] fall in the first class – steady state operation – and address security problems in the context of smart power grid systems.”
Cyber Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Grids (2012, background): “In [57], a security index was presented based on [56] and a protection scheme was proposed to further encrypt measurements to achieve maximizing their utility in terms of increased system security.”
Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “While similar stealthy attacks have been previously proposed [13, 35, 36], in this paper we extend them for generic control systems including process perturbations and measurement noise, we force the attacks to remain stealthy against stateful tests, and also force the adversary to optimize the nega”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, background): “…amount of follow up research focusing on false data injection for state estimation in the power grid, including the work of Dán and Sandberg [21], who study the problem of identifying the best k sensors to protect to minimize the impact of attacks (they assume the attacker cannot compromise…”
BlackIoT: IoT Botnet of High Wattage Devices Can Disrupt the Power Grid (2018, methodology): “Theoretical methods for detecting cyber attacks on power grids and recovering information after such attacks have also been developed [15, 20, 37, 39, 40, 55].”
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid (2011, background): “In the strong attack regime, a fundamental problem is to characterizeχ—the smallest number of meters required for unobservable attack [11], [12], [13].”
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, methodology): “For example, [45] proposed a method to optimally assign limited encryption protection resources to improve the security of the network based on its security indices.”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “D´an et al. [29] consider clusters of meters at the same attack cost for the adversary to compromise, and propose greedy algorithms for perfect and partial countermeasures against FDI attacks.”
Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market Operations (2011, background): “In [9] and [12] two possible indices are proposed for quantifying the required efforts to implement such a class of malicious data attack.”
Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems (2013, background): “prototypical deception and denial of service [8], stealth [16],”
Control-Theoretic Methods for Cyberphysical Security: Geometric Principles for Optimal Cross-Layer Resilient Control Systems (2015, background): “STEALTh ATTACk [12], [23] In a stealth attack, the attacker modifies some sensors readings by physically tampering with the individual meters or by getting access to some communication channels.”
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids (2011, background): “The preliminary version of this article [Liu et al. 2009] has attracted several research groups to investigate how to defend against false data injection attacks (e.g., [Bobba et al. 2010; Sandberg et al. 2010; Kosut et al. 2010a; 2010c; 2010b; D´ an and Sandberg 2010]).”
Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Using Machine Learning in Smart Grid (2017, background): “An attacker attempts to illegally disrupt the data exchange [7]–[12].”
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimization (2014, methodology): “[12] proposes an efficient method for computing the security index for sparse attack vectors, and describes a protection scheme to strengthen system security by placing encrypted devices in the electric power grid appropriately.”
Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA Systems (2014, methodology): “Dán and Sandberg [22] analyze stealth attacks on power system state estimators, and use a static system formulation unlike this paper.”
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey (2012, neutral): “A. Information Metering and Measurement Study in information metering and measurement can be classified into smart metering, and smart monitoring and measurement as shown in Fig.”