Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid
By Oliver Kosut, Liyan Jia, Robert J. Thomas, Lang Tong. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011
756 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a2bc9d93b97225e381a032953ddb7a893e8a89b8
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In Computer Networks and Communications
- Qing-Long Han
- Zidong Wang
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- H. Vincent Poor
- Xiaohui Liu
- Zhao Yang Dong
- André M. H. Teixeira
- Henrik Sandberg
In Control and Systems Engineering
- Qing-Long Han
- André M. H. Teixeira
- Henrik Sandberg
- Zidong Wang
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- Zhao Yang Dong
- Kin Cheong Sou
- Xiaohui Liu
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Zhao Yang Dong
- Zidong Wang
- Xiaohui Liu
- Zhu Han
- Julie Ann McCann
- H. Vincent Poor
- Karl Henrik Johansson
- Junhua Zhao
Citations in the corpus
- Smart attacks in smart grid communication networks (2012, background): “The impacts of the number of meters under manipulation on the attack observability are investigated , and the smallest set of meters sufficient for the adversary to control the smart grid are specified in [5].”
- Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis (2013, background): “Meanwhile, malicious attack against measurement data, namely false data injection attack (FDIA) has been studied in [14], [18], [26].”
- Distributed Robust Power System State Estimation (2012, background): “Interestingly, the solution of the latter minimization is provided in closed form too as (cf. [2, p. 32]) ot+1k := [ zk −Hkxt+1k ]+ λ (21) where[x]+λ denotes the simple thresholding operator [x]+λ := x+ λ, x < −λ 0, |x| ≤ λ x− λ, x > λ (22) understood entry-wise in (21).”
- Defending Against False Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation (2017, background): “In particular, we intend to provide insightful guidance on how to deploy the least defense budget to guarantee that the attacker cannot modify any set of state variables.”
- A novel method to detect bad data injection attack in smart grid (2013, background): “Kosut and his colleagues [4] divided malicious attacks into two regimes: the strong attack regime and the weak attack regime.”
- Design Techniques and Applications of Cyberphysical Systems: A Survey (2015, background): “malicious data attacks have been studied in [129].”
- Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimization (2014, methodology): “[14] characterizes two kinds of malicious attacks on electric power grid: the strong attack regime, in which false data injection attacks exist, and the weak attack regime, in which the generalized likelihood radio test can be used as a detector.”
- A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, background): “Moreover, weaknesses in cyber security can also threaten the physical security of the power systems due to the deep integration of the physical and cyber systems [1]–[6].”
- Application of Big Data and Machine Learning in Smart Grid, and Associated Security Concerns: A Review (2019, methodology): “Other notable techniques used for this cause are Bayesian framework, particle swarm optimization (PSO), adaboost, random forests, and common path mining method [200], [251]–[253].”
- Distributed Blockchain-Based Data Protection Framework for Modern Power Systems Against Cyber Attacks (2019, background): “Many studies [9]–[13] have demonstrated the impacts of FDIAs on modern power systems.”
- The role of communication systems in smart grids: Architectures, technical solutions and research challenges (2013, background): “As better explained in following sections, encryption, message authentication and intrusion detection schemes are needed to preserve data integrity and confidentiality in smart grids [21].”
- Machine Learning Methods for Attack Detection in the Smart Grid (2015, methodology): “If the residual is greater than a given threshold, a data injection attack is declared [5]–[8].”
- Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, methodology): “The outcome from the risk assessment methods may be used for risk treatment, which is also discussed in this article and related to previous work for static and dynamic systems, [18], [28], [29] and [19], [30], respectively.”
- A Survey on the Detection Algorithms for False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids (2020, background): “Authors of [27], presented the first published paper to ever investigate the varied range of possible FDIA and its impacts on smart grids.”
- State estimation under false data injection attacks: Security analysis and system protection (2018, background): “Some attack detection methods have been proposed in [7], [10] from the defenders’ perspective, and the minimum number of comprised sensors that needed to launch deception attacks has been investigated in [22] from attackers’ points of view.”