Distributed Internet-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Smart Power Grids
By Hamed Mohsenian Rad, Alberto Leon-Garcia. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/efd5ac9f06606eb832f63ecb23f6dc5fb25b3b7b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Prateek Mittal
- H. Vincent Poor
- Saleh Soltan
- Fei Hu
- Francesco Bullo
- Yao Liu
- Florian Dörfler
- Fabio Pasqualetti
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Florian Dörfler
- Francesco Bullo
- Fabio Pasqualetti
- Prateek Mittal
- Fei Hu
- H. Vincent Poor
- Yao Liu
- Saleh Soltan
In Control and Systems Engineering
- Florian Dörfler
- Francesco Bullo
- Fabio Pasqualetti
- H. Vincent Poor
- Prateek Mittal
- Saleh Soltan
- Fei Hu
- Yao Liu
Citations in the corpus
- Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, unknown): “Compromising the CPS’s confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, or safety.”
- Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems (2013, unknown): “We consider a load altering attack [18]”
- BlackIoT: IoT Botnet of High Wattage Devices Can Disrupt the Power Grid (2018, background): “An important characteristic of MadIoT attacks is that unlike most of previous attacks on the power grid, they do not target the power grid’s Supervisory Control And Data Acquisitions (SCADA) system but rather the loads that are much less protected as in load-altering attacks studied in [11, 41].”
- Detection of Faults and Attacks Including False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid Using Kalman Filter (2014, methodology): “The work in [8] uses the data concatenation and random drop schemes to defend a traffic analysis attack, and the study in [9] is about defending the Internet-based load altering attack.”
- Control-Theoretic Methods for Cyberphysical Security: Geometric Principles for Optimal Cross-Layer Resilient Control Systems (2015, background): “un i + This attack can originate from a genuine loss of generation or load, a malicious attack via the governor control to disrupt the system functionality [22], or an Internet-based load-altering attack [25].”