Cash and Corporate Control

By O. Faleye. 2004

185 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f02b1111b71a8ea847498e7be4bbb38c5d2893a3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Growing Out of Trouble? Corporate Responses to Liability Risk (2011, unknown): “One potential explanation is that accumulating cash would arouse suspicion from investors and is linked empirically to proxy fights and executive turnover (Faleye 2004).”
Corporate governance and hedge fund activism (2011, unknown): “These performance improvements often include reductions in cash positions, providing evidence thathedgefundsreduceagencycostsassociatedwithfreecashflows(seeJensen1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Faleye 2004 ).”
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “Prior studies on activism almost always find that shareholder activists are more likely to target poorly performing firms (e.g., Gordon and Pound (1993), Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), Faleye (2004), Becht et al. (2007)).”
Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, background): “We conjecture that managers avoid that approach because it would more readily arouse suspicion from investors and is linked empirically to proxy fights and executive turnover (Faleye, 2004).”
Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. (2007, unknown): “Harford (1999) and Blanchard, Lopez-deSilanes and Shleifer (1994) examine how firms use cash windfalls or large cash reserves without focusing on corporate governance or the value of cash, and Faleye (2004) investigates the role of proxy fights in containing cash policy.”
Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US (2008, background): “Faleye (2004) shows that proxy contests are increasing in excess cash reserves, and following such contests, executive turnover and cash distributions to shareholders increase while cash holdings significantly decline.”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “We follow a well-established line of research (e.g., Bates et al. 2009; Dittmar et al. 2003; D’Mello et al. 2008; Faleye 2004; Frésard and Salva 2010; Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999; among others) to distinguish a firm’s excess cash holdings from its optimal cash holdings.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings (2006, unknown): “Faleye (2004) shows that proxy contests are increasing in excess cash reserves, and following such contests, executive turnover and cash distributions to shareholders increase while cash holdings significantly decline.”
Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “See for example Gordon and Pound (1993), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) who study shareholder proposals and Faleye (2004) who study proxy contests.”
Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, unknown): “In particular, firms with low managerial ownership (Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Faleye, 2004), institutional ownership (Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Brav et al.”
Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment (2007, unknown): “I then estimate logistic regressions similar to those in Section 5.1 above, controlling for other determinants of the probability of a proxy contest as in Faleye (2004).”