Corporate governance and hedge fund activism
By N. Boyson, Robert M. Mooradian. 2011
158 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4f5e0258e6fe1b73e2308ec8f6b18c8896b0278
Citations in the corpus
- The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, unknown): “While Brav et al. (2008), Clifford (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Klein and Zur (2009, 2011), Boyson and Mooradian (2011, 2012), and Clifford and Lindsey (2011) focus on activism, we examine the choice between exit and voice.”
- Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research (2017, unknown): “Using somewhat different samples, Greenwood and Schor (2009), Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009), Boyson and Mooradian (2011), and Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2015) find average abnormal stock returns that range from 3.61%–8.68%.”
- Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “Boyson & Mooradian (2011) show that hedge fund activism is associated with gains in long-term operating performance and short-term stock performance.”
- Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Boyson and Mooradian (2011) show that hedge fund activism is associated with gains in long-term operating performance and short-term stock performance.”
- Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, unknown): “events 2003-2005); Boyson and Mooradian (2011) (418 events 1994-2005).”