Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings

230 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis (2009, unknown): “In addition, a working paper by Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) demonstrates that poorly governed firms (which have lower profitability) hold less cash than well governed firms.”
The Impact of Working Capital Management on Firm Profitability in Different Business Cycles: Evidence from Finland (2014, background): “Other studies show that firms with 8 weaker corporate governance structures hold smaller cash reserves (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008).”
International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems (2007, unknown): “Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2006) report that firms with expected poor governance actually hold less cash, but that, for a given set of firms with high cash levels, firms with worse expected governance spend their cash more quickly, primarily on acquisitions.”
Payout Policy, Agency Conflicts, and Corporate Governance (2006, unknown): “In the absence of pre-commitment, poorly monitored managers will be less likely to use the discretion to repurchase, instead they will retain excess cash in the firm and use it on inefficient investment projects (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2005).”