Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings.

By Amy K. Dittmar, Jan Mahrt-Smith. 2007

2,107 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f9eba21965c76425454e1992f6b4dda23b64a0a3

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Citations in the corpus

Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions to pension contributions (2009, methodology): “To 39 capture empire building, I use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index of corporate governance, a measure of managerial entrenchment (Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)), and institutional blockholdings (Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)).”
Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms (2013, neutral): “Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) explain that better governance quality reduces the risk of managerial misappropriation of available cash, which increases the contribution of additional cash holdings to firm value.”
Determinants of corporate cash holdings: evidence from the emerging market of Turkey (2014, background): “…in cash level among firms in the various countries may be attributable to several reasons, such as corporate governance (Dittmar et al., 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Chen, 2008; Kuan et al., 2011), multinationality (Ramírez and Tadesse, 2009) and firm-specific variables.2 Although…”
Boardroom Diversity and its Effect on Social Performance: Conceptualization and Empirical Evidence (2013, methodology): “As employed in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Francoeur et al.”
The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect corporate cash holdings? (2017, positive): “2003), cash is worth less when agency problems are more severe (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Pinkowitz et al. 2006), and firms with excess cash invest in more acquisitions and those acquisitions are value-decreasing (Harford 1999).”
Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments (2015, methodology): “Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Masulis et al. (2009), we also include the interaction between”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, positive): “…assets (Myers and Rajan 1998) and thus are likely to be used in a discretionary fashion, particularly when corporate governance is poor, resulting in a decrease in firm value (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Frésard and Salva 2010; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; Masulis et al. 2009; among others).”
Equity or Debt Financing: Does Good Corporate Governance Matter? (2012, neutral): “10 Studies using E index include Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Bates,et al.”
Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US (2008, background): “More broadly, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) document that shareholders assign a lower value to an additional dollar of cash reserves when agency problems are likely to be greater at the firm.”
Stakeholder welfare and firm value (2010, methodology): “To separate activist public pension funds from other institutional investors in CDA/Spectrum 13F filings, we collectively identify 20 largest activist public pension funds used in Cremers and Nair (2005), Larcker et al. (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).”
The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value Around the World (2012, positive): “This hypothesis is in the same spirit to hypotheses on the value of cash holdings for wellgoverned firms (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)), and particularly in countries with strong shareholder protection (Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007)).”