Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective

By M. Huson, R. Parrino, Laura T. Starks. 2001

1,067 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Gender Studies, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f011bfbf779bdd14cabd649a27d6084ed6ba582b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Ronald W. Masulis
2. Gary Gang Tian
3. Jeong‐Bon Kim
4. Alex Edmans
5. Xiaofei Pan
6. Xavier Gabaix
7. Dirk Jenter
8. L. Naveen

In Gender Studies

1. Jeffrey L. Coles
2. Ugur Lel
3. Darius P. Miller
4. L. Naveen
5. Nina Baranchuk
6. Philip H. Dybvig
7. Dirk Jenter
8. Naveen D. Daniel

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

1. Omesh Kini
2. Jeffrey L. Coles
3. Ugur Lel
4. Darius P. Miller
5. L. Naveen
6. Nina Baranchuk
7. Philip H. Dybvig
8. Dirk Jenter

Citations in the corpus

• Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment (2007, neutral): “Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) study antitakeover charter amendments and find a negative but insignificant average abnormal return for their subsample of 28 classified board announcements.”
• Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, positive): “Following Huson et al. (2001), we include the change in accounting performance, measured as the change of ROA from year t-1 to year t, and the natural logarithm of firm sales.”
• Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders* (2006, background): “0022-2186/2006/4902-0024$01.50 I. Introduction The decline in disciplinary takeover activity in the late 1980s placed a greater burden on internal mechanisms for controlling agency conflicts between managers and stockholders (see, for example, Mikkelson and Partch 1997; Murphy 1999; Huson, Parrino,…”
• How Has CEO Turnover Changed (2012, neutral): “For example, see Huson et al. (2001). Non-standard or external turnover is turnover due to a merger”
• Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender (2005, neutral): “Alternatively, larger boards may be less likely to add anyone, male or female, since the trend has been to reduce board size as depicted in Table 2 and noted by Huson et al. (2001).”
• Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions (2003, neutral): “13 For comparison, Huson et al. (2001) define 20 percent of their CEO turnovers as forced over the sample period 1983–1994 but document a higher incidence of forced turnover (23.”
• Boards: Does One Size Fit All? (2008, methodology): “7 Huson et al (2001) have data on the Forbes 800 firms from 1971-1994.”