How Has CEO Turnover Changed

By Steven N. Kaplan, Bernadette A. Minton. 2012

492 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea9c06c364ac9b63daa8b702ae2079a748d26c3a

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Citations in the corpus

Are employee-friendly workplaces conducive to innovation? (2016, background): “First, Kaplan and Minton (2012) state that forced and voluntary turnover cases exhibit similar patterns.”
Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, unknown): “Our results are similar to those in prior papers (e.g., Table 4, Kaplan and Minton (2012)).”
Co-opted Boards (2014, unknown): “…is a means to align executive incentives with shareholder interests (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; Bizjak, Brickley, and 5 See Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), and Kaplan and Minton (2012).”
Female directors, board committees and firm performance (2018, unknown): “…on the likelihood of outside CEO appointments.17 A more general concern is that our baseline models with firm fixed effects are identified by events of CEO turnover, which are often preceded by poor firm performance, or a shock to profitability (Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Gregory-Smith et al, 2009).”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “The fraction of outside directors on boards and the level of institutional stock ownership have increased since the 1970s (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001), while CEO turnovers have become more frequent (Kaplan and Minton, 2011) and closely linked to rm performance (Jenter and Lewellen, 2017).”
Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “Of several potential ex-post disciplinary actions, we focus on forced CEO turnover since it is considered to be one of the most aggressive corporate governance actions (e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 2012).”
Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers (2018, unknown): “Stock performance is measured by the stock return adjusted to industry similar to Kaplan and Minton (2012), yet the results are robust to not applying the industry adjustment 33 .”
Ownership structures and R&D in Europe: the good institutional investors, the bad and ugly impatient shareholders (2013, background): “They may have a general aversion to innovation because of the risk of managerial turnover: if R&D projects conclude with failure, the board of directors can dismiss managers (David el al., 1996; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Aghion et al., 2010).”