Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups

By Randall K. Morck, Bernard Yeung. 2003

1,192 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea22328d41a062740e3164f5dc9ce450da316a31

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Citations in the corpus

Family Control, Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms (2014, background): “The agency problem associated with conflict between principals arises when there is a conflict between shareholder groups with divergent goals (c.f. Morck and Yeung 2003).”
Strategy, ownership, governance, and socio-psychological perspectives on family businesses from around the world (2012, background): “Additionally, the authors suggest that Morck and Yeung’s (2003) indictment of family firms may have been”
The Relationship between Family Firms and Corporate Governance (2006, background): “Morck and Yeung (2003) note the potential for a family business group to organize itself into a pyramidal control structure that facilitates the expropriation of wealth from nonfamily shareholders in family subsidiaries to family holding companies.”
Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy (2008, background): “This can give rise to a new agency conflict, that is, one between the controlling family and the minority shareholders, who can be expropriated by opportunistic behavior by the managers/owners (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Morck et al., 1988; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Schulze et al., 2001).”
How does family control influence firm strategy and performance? A meta-analysis of us publicly listed firms (2015, background): “In these dissenting perspectives, FFs achieve financial prominence by their political connections and favored access to resources rather than through technological and competitive prowess (Morck & Yeung, 2003).”
Value Is in the Eye of the Owner (2012, background): “…may be exacerbated when an ownership stake is vested with extended control mechanisms, such as pyramidal groups that separate ownership from control, the entrenchment of controlling families, and nonarm’s-length transactions (i.e., “tunneling”) between related companies (Morck & Yeung, 2003).”
Family ownership and R&D investment: The role of growth opportunities and business group membership (2015, background): “Instead, family owners may prefer to emphasize alternative ways to maintain and expand their businesses, such as political lobbying (Morck & Yeung, 2003).”
Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan (2010, neutral): “Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that while this view may be valid in the United States, it is by and large incomplete, if not in error, with regard to familycontrolled business firms in other parts of the world.”
The role of family ownership in international entrepreneurship: exploring nonlinear effects (2012, background): “…Resource restrictions, especially capital (Chandler 1990; Grassby 2000; Landes 1949); (b) conservative strategies (Allio 2004; Poza et al. 1997) due to family needs of stability (Morck and Yeung 2003); (c) family conflicts and succession difficulties (Jehn 1997; Levinson 1971; Schulze et al. 2003).”
Income Smoothing in Family‐Controlled Companies: Evidence from Italy (2011, neutral): “The agency perspective focuses on the agency relationships between the controlling family and managers (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Morck and Yeung, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).”
Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From Poland (2010, background): “Morck and Yeung (2003) maintain that FIM does not necessarily mitigate agency problems, especially when the family controls a group of publicly traded firms.”
Innovation in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review and Guidance for Future Research (2018, background): “…Block (2012); Muñoz-Bullón and Sanchez-Bueno (2011); Munari et al. (2010); Chen and Hsu (2009); Chin et al. (2009); Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009); Morck and Yeung (2003) Family Ownership; Family Management R&D Intensity; Number of Patents; Patent Citations Family ownership is negatively…”